-crashed into side of mountain (Reason, 1990) The aircraft that pilot's fly today are the safest and most complex in history. So why are we still having problems with CFIT? The answer is as complex as the aircraft. As pilots, we do not l i e to admit that pilot error could be a contributing factor. If we cannot identify or r e h e to recognize the source ofthe problem, then we cannot begin to find a solution. Pilots must be willing to admit that they are the weak l i n k in the chain and approach this problem in an aggressive manner. With the introduction of advanced avionics, the aviation i n* has seen the CFIT accident rate go down. Initial and recurrent training will also be a key factor when approaching the problem.
Conrrolled Fli~ht Into Terrain

Worldwide and U.S. Airline Number of Fatal Accidents
Classified by Type of Accident -1988 Accident - -1997 Probable Causes of CFIT Accidents To be able to find a solution, we have to look at some specific accidents that the primary cause was CFIT. By reviewing these accidents, wecan compile information that was derived kom the accident investigation and begin to recognize some common causal factors. One of the more recent accidents involved an American Aiilies B-757 near Cali, Columbia on December 20, 1995. Although several factors led to the accident, situational awareness of the cockpit crew seemed to very low, which led to the impact with a mountain peak. According to Dr. Mica Endsley fiom theUniversityofSouthern California, situationalawareness can be defined as 'The perception of elements in the environment, the comprehension oftheir meaningandtheir projection into the near future" (Mancuso, 1995) . In other words, the crew did not lmow their location at a critical time of flight.
It should be noted that the Cali accident was not investigated by the National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) but by Columbia's Aeronautics Civil which is the Columbian equivalent of our Federal Aviation Admimistration (FAA) (Garrison, 1997) . In the accident, the crew reportedly entered the wrong data into the flight management computer (FMC) and commanded the aircraft to go the Romeo Non Directional Beacon (NDB) versus the RozoNDB pornhein, 1996) . Rozo was the correct NDB to use for the approach into Cali. The flight crew failed to recognize that the new data entered into the FMC would take them off course. American Airlines proposed that the flight crew's Mure to perceive the FMC-initiated turn away Eom the intendedrouting, was one probable cause for the accident (Dornhein, 1996) . From that moment on, they were not fully aware of their location. Other probable causes that were brought out in the investigation are:
I. Design of the FMS to include displays, database, and lack of terrain displayed.
2. The psychological relationship of pilots to onboard automation.
3. System wamings with 111 power when spdbrakes are deployed 4. Lack of angle of attack information in the cockpit for pilots to be able to achieve maximumperformance climbs.
5. Ambiguous naming (Columbia government) of navigation aids.
6. Linguistic barriers between pilots and controllers (Garrison, 1997).
On January 13, 1998, a Learjet 258 crashed approximately two miles short of the George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas. In this case, the aircrew was conducting an approach into the airport using an Instrument Landing System WS). The captain started the approach but transferred control to the &st officer shmly after passing the final approach fix (FAF) . Although the ILS indicator in the cockpit showed that the aircraft was on the localizer, the glideslope showed that the aircraR was well above glidepath. The captain elected to continue the appmach by telling the first officer to increase rate of descent to "catch" the glideslope @atq 1999). The mew continued below the decision height and impacted the ground. All data retrieved from the accident indicated that the aircraft was actually below glidepath. An error was detected in the glidepath indicator during the accident investigation.
The NTSB determined that several incidents occurred that led up to the Leajet going below the glidepath and colliding with the ground:
1. The crew did not perform an approach briefing that was required by the flight crew's company.
2. Thecaptain's decision to cuntinuetheapproacb by transferring control to the first offim after passing the FAF.
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3. The captain's decision to continue the approach while the glideslope indicator was showing well above glidepath.
4. Theairplane'scorporateoperatortoproperly fix theglideslope indicator, that hadbeen reportednot properly indicating correct glidepath information on a previous flight (Katz, 1999) . It was also noted that if a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) was installed, it may havegiven the pilots adequate warning before impact with the terrain. Although this may have helped to prevent this accident, a GPWS was not required for this type of aircraft or operation.
An accident involving a Korean Aii B-747 happened on 2. The captain's fatigue due to a recent trip returning fiom Hong Kong on August 4th.
3. Koreans Air's inadequate flight mew training. 4. The FAA's intentional inhibition of the minimum safe altitude warning WSAW) system at Guam. An interesting side note about the Korean Air accident is apparently the low altitude alarms aboard the plane were operating properly, but the pilots largely ignored them (Jackson, 1998) .
An accident involving a Express 11 Jetstream BA3100, occmed while on a localizer back course in Hibbiig, M i e s o t a on December 1,1993. According to the NTSB, a breakdown in crew coordination was the probable cause of the accident (Air Safety Center, 1999) . This led to loss of altitude a m m e s s by the flight crew dwing an unstabilized approach at night and impacting the ground short of the runway. According to the accident report, contributing to the accident was:
1. Failure of the company management to adequately address the previous identified deficiencies in airmanship and crew resource management (CRM).
2. The failure of the company to identify and correct a widespread, unapproved practice during instrument approach procedures. 3. TheFAA inadequatesurveillanceandoversight of the air carrier (Air Safety Center, 1999).
Although the above examples are not the only factors that contribute to CFIT type accidents, they can help to formulate some common causes. All four involved some type of degradation of crew communication which resulted fiom a low situational awareness in the cockpit. In the American Airlines accident, wrong data was entered in the FMS and neither aircrew backed up the data. The Learjet aircrew failed to conduct an approach briefing prior to executing the approach. The Korean Aim crew failed to monitor the captain's execution of the approach and the action's of the Express I1 captain led to the breakdown in crew coordination.
The next common factor in these accidents is lack of advanced avionics or the proper use of the systems that are on board the aircrafl. The Cali accident involved systems that failed to warn the pilots of rapidly increasing terrain, speedbrakes deployed or maximum pfonnance climb information. Also, the accident prompted the FAA to recommend a new system to be installed called the Enhanced GPWS FGPWS). Information about this system will be addressed later in this paper. The Leajet259 crash involved using an inoperative glideslope indicator. In the Korean Aii disaster, the Aii Traffic Control (ATC) system, MSAW, was not working. If the MSAW system was operating, the air traffic controller could have advised the aircrew of possible ground impact. Also, this ose brings out the fact that the low altitude warning a l m s were working in the cockpit, but the aircrew iiled to take any actions. Finally, in the Express 11 incident, the loss of altitude awareness was due to possible actions of the captain to limit time in severe icing conditions (Aii Safety Center ,, 1999). The findings by the NTSB also found that if a GPWS system was installed, it may have given the pilots enough warning to avoid collision with the ground.
Training Airerew in CFIT Prevention
According to Daniel Maurino, the coordiinator of the ICAO flight safety and human factors program, the introduction of advanced systems on a large scale, may have produced two flaws:
1. It was technology-driven rather than humancentered.
2. It stopped short of the micro-level of system design analysis (Maurino, 1993) .
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Maurino's analysis of the problem seems to indicate that with the development of advanced systems, the human element was not taken entirely into consideration.
In 1992, the Flight Safety Foundation @SF) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), organized a CFIT Task Force. The task force set as a five year goal a fifty percent reduction in CFIT accidents (Flight Safety Foundation, 1999) . According to the FSF, the task forceachieved that goal in 1996 and 1997 by concentrating on four areas: I. Adopting standard operating procedures which deal with prevention of CFIT.
2. Revise training programs which would incorporate CFIT training into CRM programs.
3. Training air traffic controllers in CFIT prevention and the MSAW system (Air Safety Center ,,
1999).
With the development of CFIT prevention into the CRM programs commercial operators can incorporate CFIT training into their initial and recurrent CRM training. It has already been established by the airline industry that CRM has helped aircrew to inaease sihlational awareness. With the addition of CFIT Waining, CRM will be able to incorporate a high degree of awareness of possible scenarios that can lead up to these types of accidents.
After the crash of the Korean Air 9-747 in Guam, the airline's chief of flight crew operations, testified to the NTSB that CRM training had been revised since the accident. Captain Lee Jung Taek stated in his testimony Current and Future Avionics Used to Prevent ClTT W& these new training programs beiig implemented in the commercial carriers, the other area that needs to be looked at is avionics. One of the major causes in the reduction of CFIT was the introduction of GPWS in the mid 1970's. As the figure 2 indicates, the CFIT accident rate has significantly declined since GPWS was introduced but it did not eliminate it. As has been pointed out in this paper, three reasons that may have attributed to that are;
AIR TRANSPORT CFIT ACCIDENTS
1. Not properly training airaew to include CRM training with use of GPWS.
2. Limitations in the system that will not give warnings in critical areas of flight.
3. Aircrew ignoring the low altitude warning indications.
Along with training aircrew in therecognitionand avoidance of CFIT scenarios, the aviation industry has developed several types of avionics to aid the aircrew in CFIT accident reduction. Although GPWS had gone through major upgrades and changes over the years, there are still certain flight regimes that GPWS is ineffective in giving adequate warning. It can only provide information to the pilots on the terrain directly below the aircraft, utilizimg a radar altimeter. If the terrain directly in eont of the air& increases rapidly, the GPWS may not be able to detect the increase in time to give the pilot adequate warning to react. One of the findings in the American Airlines accident in Cali, Colombia, was that the aircraft did have a functioning GPWS, hut it was not effective due to the rapid inneasing terrain @wnheh 1996).
The EGPWS system had been out for several months prior to the December, 1995 accident in Cali. It was this accident that prompted the FAA to encourage the airlines to put the system in all of their aircraft (Evans, 2000 (Allidsignal, 1996) .
A slightly different version of GPWS is called AutoGround Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS) that has been developed by the military. Auto-GCAS is a last defense system that overrides the pilot's controls to automatically execute a climb or turning recovery (Scott, 1996) . The system assumes that the pilot is unaware of the circumstance and takes over the controls momentarily. Auto-GCAS uses a terrain database as well as a radar altimeter to predict theupcoming terrain. When the system predicts a possible collision with the ground, it automatically executes the escape maneuver. If the any components ofthe system fails, the Auto-GCAS commands the airaaft to climb. The system was succffshlly tested on U.S. Air Force F-16 aircraft, but can be adapted to any aircraft with varying escape profiles. (Scotf 1996) Another unique sysrern that is being tested is the Transponder Landing System (TLS). The TLS utilizes the aircraft transponder and the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) on the ground to give the pilot position and attitude information (Pimu, 1999) . The TLS will provide the pilot with the same display as an ILS would The TLS also has the ability to adjust the beam so it would not be a bed signal as in the ILS, and would have the ability to guide aircraft for landing out to 22 nautical miles (Picou, 1999) .
Although the EGPWS is the most advanced and an improvement over the standard GPWS system, there are still some inherent flaws in the system. The Allied Pilots Association is lobbying for a system that gives pilots a four dimensional view of the upcoming terrain (Goyer, 1998) . The EGPWS currently displays only a three dimensional view or a bid's eye display using color codes to depict terrain height in relation to the aircraft's current altitude.
The four dimensional system would also give the pilots a graphical representation of approaching terrain, as well as flight path projections (Goyer, 1998) .
Aii traffic controllers also have the ability to help prevent CFIT. IfATC systems are working correctly and controllers are able to interpret the information, such accidents could be prevented The MSAW system was created for just that reason. There are two main reasons that thesystem has not prevented such high profile accidents such as the American
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Airlines in Cali, Columbia and the Korean Aii in Guam. First, the system has to be installed. Currently, only the U.
S., Japan and Israel have the system . The second reason is the system has to be working conectly.
The MSAW system was installed, but not covering the area when the crash occurred in the Korean Air disaster in Guam.
Another interesting statistic suggests that execution of non-precision approaches increase the rate of CFIT accidents. A shldy by the Approach and Landing Accident Reduction Task Force (ALAR) found that 50% of the CFIT accidents occurred during the approach and landing phase of the flight and 75% of those occurred at airports that did not have precision approach navigation aids. The ALAR Task Force was formed by the Flight Safety Foundation and studied 156 CFIT accidents i?om 1988 -1994 . The study goes to suggest that replacing nonprecision approach systemswithprecisionapproaches, may reduce the CFIT accident rate.
Concerns and Potential Problems
One concern that has been mentioned is the integration of the advanowl avionics and the human machine. Although systems aboard the airaaft are designed to help the pilot avoid CFIT scenarios, if the airaew is not sensitized and trained to use and interpret the avionics correctly, it literally makes the equipment useless. The investigation in Guam of the Korean Aii B747, indicated that the altitude alert systems aboard the airaaft were working correctly, but the aircrew chose to ignore the appropriate warnings and continue the descent and impactedtheground. Improper training and lack ofaircrew coordination contributed to this accident and has been a major factor in many more. Another example ofthis involved a Southwest Airlines B-737 performing a hard landing at the Burbank-GlendalePasadena Airport on March 5,2000. The aircral? skidded off the runway and slightly injured fifteen people. Preliminary investigations indicated that the aircraft was flying an unstable approach. An unstable approach is one in which an airaafl;
1. is not aligned with the runway at a sufficient height, 2. is not descending at a steady rate, 3. hils to capture the glideslope or correct vertical profile, 4. does not attain the desired speed, or 5. does not establish the desired configuration (Slatter, 1997) . Further investigation of the Southwest Airlines accident indicated the aircraft had a steeper than normal glidepath of up to six degrees caused by a late descent past the FAF (Phillips, 2000) . The "'sink rate, pull up" voice warning alarm lkomthe GPWS system soundedseveraltimes during theapproach and the aircraft approach speed was almost 60
MPH faster than the normal approah speed (Phillips, 2000) . This recent accident illustrates the problem that is still present with avionics and crew integration.
General Aviation (GA) and corporate aircraft are not required to have such systems aboard their airaaft. Since those type of aircrafl do most of the flying in the U.S., CFIT is a major concern for them. Although studies for the CFIT accident rate for GA and corporate airaafi are not noted in this paper, we can assume that it is a problem. So why not install these warning devices in the aircraft? Cost is the prohibiting factor for putting a system like GPWS in these aircrqft.
Regional carriers also have concerns about more advanced systems. The indusmhas spentmillions in recent years installing the GPWS in their fleet ofaircraft. Now the (Marks, 1998) . Conclusion The first part in finding a solution to CFIT accident prevention seems to be a comprehensive plan of proper aircrew training in the following:
1. The use and coordination of avionics systems that help prevent CFIT accidents.
2. Integrating CFIT scenarios into CRM in the initial and recurrent training of aircrew.
3. Encourage open communication between flight crew where pilots check each other in critical phases of flight such as approach and landing.
4. Perform approach briefings to increase situational awareness in the cockpit.
The second part of the solution deals with aircraft systems in the aircraft. The proper use of altitude warning systems is the key to accident prevention. Plans are being developed for new systems, however, the FAA should take into amunt the time and cost to efllectively integrate these systems into the airline industry. Estimated total cost for upgrades to the EGPWS system for the regional airline industry would be in excess of $115 million (CommerciaVRegional Airline News, 1998) . This could adversely impact the smaller airlines significantly. It is unrealistic to assume that ifa new system is developed (like the EGPWS), that it will immediately be put into use. By the EGPWS system would be $23,900 for an aircraft that utilizing the proper integration of aircrew training and already has the GPWS installed and $40,000 for a complete current altitude avoidance systems, the CFIT reduction rate system that would include a display in the coEkpit can be reduced. New and improved systems should (CommerciaVRegional Airline News, 1998). The time line continue to be developed and installed, but at a reasonable set forth by the FAA may be unreasonable. As indicated pace that will not impede the growth of the airline above, if the FAA gets its way, all commercial airaaft will industry.0 Roger C. Matteson is an Assistant Professor of aviation at Central Washington University. He holds an MBA in Aviation and a Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Science f?om Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He is a retired Air Force pilot and has earned Master CFI designation f?om the National Association of Flight Instructors.
